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CANDID AND IMPARTIAL  
CONSIDERATIONS  
ON THE  
PRELIMINARY ARTICLES  
OF  
P E A C E  
WITH  
FRANCE AND SPAIN,  
AND THE  
PROVISIONAL TREATY  
WITH THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

By a COUNTRY GENTLEMAN.

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B Joseph J. Corbe  
Providence R.I.  
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OBSERVATIONS  
ON THE  
PRELIMINARY ARTICLES, &c.

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**H**E who writes on any great political question of the day often deceives himself by adopting mistaken opinions, or more frequently attempts to deceive his fellow-citizens by the publication of false assertions, and interested arguments. In the former case he is pardonable; in the latter he is inexcusable: no attention to procure the best information can at all times protect the most candid and enlightened enquirer from the former misfortune; but nothing but the most flagrant and intentional guilt can betray him into the latter; it may surely be emphatically called a misfortune,  
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tune, when the object is, at the same time, criminal and unhappy.

The writer of these sheets is concerned in the subject, merely as a citizen of the empire, unconnected with any party, and of no political consequence; he ventures to suggest a few hints and observations, at this most important crisis, without a wish to gratify private interest or public malevolence, careless of censure or applause from any reader, who may throw his eye over these pages with any other view than that of cool and deliberate investigation.

In the present season of national difficulty it is the duty of every member of this free state to turn his attention to the situation of public affairs, and to contemplate with calmness and reflection the great scene before him: the projecting part of the picture, that which throws all the other far into the back ground,  
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is the peace now on the tapis with the different nations, with which we have been long engaged in an unhappy and destructive war; the great outlines of the peace have been drawn by the respective plenipotentiaries and commissioners of the contending powers, and will soon be confirmed by a definitive treaty; it may not be amiss that every man, for every man is concerned, should express his sentiments on an occasion where somewhat may be found to blame, and somewhat to commend: by the communication of various ideas, information may be extended; some lights may be thrown on subjects not universally considered, and some errors may be removed into which the public mind may have fallen by various attempts to mislead, excited by mean, personal envy, or disappointed ambition, and plann'd by a restless and artful ingenuity.

Whoever wishes to estimate the terms of this peace with judgment and impartiality must take into his consideration the present situation of this country. He will then behold it, as it is, and not as he wishes it to be; the object of his senses, not of his imagination; oppressed by the accumulated miseries of a long and unsuccessful war; a war rendered particularly disadvantageous by the number and strength of the powers to which we are opposed; by the remoteness of the theatre on which the bloody scenes are acted; by the infinite expence of transportation of forces, stores, and provisions to various garrisons detached in different parts of the world; by the immense increase of a ruinous national debt; by an almost universal decay of commerce and manufactures; by an hourly extending difficulty in recruiting our fleets and armies; and by what may be deemed the worst of all national misfortunes, the want of a truly enlarged public

public spirit, and an extinction of that real patriotism, which, in the threatening hour of danger, ever points to national unanimity, as the only path to national security.

Of the three foreign powers leagued against us in this war, one was our ancient and natural ally; however her councils may of late have been warped by the insidious policy, or the more public influence of a powerful and domineering neighbour, her real interests are still connected with ours; she is the firmest continental support of the constitutional independence of Britain; every native of the united Low Countries, who has looked into the records of past time, or turns his eye towards the future, must dread the increasing power of the House of Bourbon, and can find no poise to that immense bulk, but the weight of the British empire hung on the opposite end of the lever. Such have been, and such must  
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ever be the decided sentiments of the genuine patriots of Holland; in the general commotion of parties and interests artfully roused to an unnatural war, the still, small voice of truth was drowned in the tumult of the bribed and infatuated multitude; but the return of peace, with the blessings of commerce in her train, will soon remove the delusion.

Many of our most worthy and intelligent citizens were averse to the prosecution of a war against these our natural and original allies, and their powerful opposition rendered it additionally difficult to maintain, if not totally impracticable.

But the general system of the war had additional obstacles to encounter; founded originally on an unfortunate dissention with our fellow-citizens beyond the Atlantic, on motives which I think it now unnecessary to praise or censure, it involved, in its rise and progress, the passions,



sions, the habits, the connections, and the interests of many of the ablest, the most virtuous, and most distinguished inhabitants of these kingdoms; many such opposed the prosecution of it with the most laudable intentions, and by the vigour and perseverance of their opposition obtained that famous vote of the House of Commons, which rendered the effectual prosecution of the war impracticable, and consequently left no alternative but Peace.—Hard must be the fate of him who is bound by duty, as well as necessity, to grasp at an object, and becomes criminal by the attainment!

Never was there a period in our history, except that of the dreadful civil war in the last century, in which the baneful influence of party spirit had more pervaded all orders and professions, than the age in which we live; in the virtuous days of Greece and Rome, the Grecian or Roman soldier, while in the field, had  
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no enemies but those of his country ; his contests in the Areopagus, or his harangues in the Forum, were forgotten till the battle was fought, and the triumph of his general restored him to the busy commotions of civil life. The states of Greece were usually engaged in petty, intestine wars, till necessity assembled them in one great cause against the power of Persia ; on such an occasion the heat of private rancour was cooled ; personal animosity was forgotten ; even that virtuous passion of local jealousy, founded on local patriotism, was suspended.—Themistocles, labouring for the welfare of united Greece, bade his rival colleague “ strike, but hear,” and forgot the man and the Athenian in the general cause of his country.

Who can forbear drawing the dreadful humiliating contrast ?—Let the voice of contending and accusing parties, which still echoes in our senates, and brawls in  
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our public streets, bear witness to the disgraceful truth; let the ill success of our fleets; let the capture of our armies; let the consequential loss of our provinces record to posterity at least one dishonourable source of our national misfortunes; and may the faithful pen of history mark with infamy to ages yet unborn, those who may be found guilty of such atrocious violations of every public duty.

Such then must appear the state of this country; engaged in a wide-wasting war with various powers, among the rest with our ancient and real ally, and with our numerous, powerful, and once well-affected fellow-citizens; without a single ally in the wide extent of the Universe; feebly supported by an heterogeneous army of stipendaries, not auxiliaries, composed from different nations not united to us by common interests, a common language, or any other bond of social connection; the native part of our army divided by

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private

private envy and jealousy, by public rancour and malevolence—Our fleets disunited by faction; the Union flag of Britain changed into the ensign of Discord; our civil councils jarring and divided; no great and consistent plan of war adopted, or indeed at this time practicable; no constant influx of resources to support the continuance of hostilities, or the various exigencies of a state engaged in more than Quixotic adventures; the landed interest of the nation losing sight of visionary aids and air-drawn subsidies which an ideal America held forth to their distempered imaginations; the commercial interest alarmed and desponding; all united in the cry for peace, and in nothing else; all ready to hail the Dove, which should return to their long wandering Ark with the branch of Olive; all sighing for an Ararat, on which to rest from the agitation of the tempest.

The Dove is at length returned—Has she returned in vain, or has she brought



the real Olive? That is the question I wish to discuss, always keeping in view our present relative situation; expecting from ministers what is fairly practicable; neither excusing their negligence, if such shall be found, nor expecting impossibilities from their zeal, their knowledge, or their vigilance.

I mean therefore to make some observations on the preliminaries with France and Spain, and the provisional treaty with America, in the order in which they were lay'd before both Houses of Parliament, and since printed by Authority.

First with FRANCE as to Newfoundland and the Fisheries.

The King of Great Britain retains, as before, the full sovereignty of the island of Newfoundland and the adjacent islands (except St. Pierre and Miquelon) as the whole was ceded to him by the 13th ar-

ticle of the treaty of Utrecht. France had a right by the 13th article of the treaty of Utrecht to take fish, dry them on land, and erect stages and huts for that purpose only, from Cape Bonavista on the east side of the island round by the north to Point Riche on the west side: this right was confirmed by the fifth article of the treaty of Paris, and the present preliminary articles alter the stipulations of the treaty of Utrecht only in the boundary line, which is now on the east side at Cape St. John, much farther north than Cape Bonavista the former boundary, and extending round by the north to Cape Ray on the west side, farther south than Point Riche the former western boundary, thus taking away from France, on the east side, where the fishery is most profitable, a line of coast equal to what is added on the western side, and leaving the respective rights of fishery of both nations nearly in the same situation

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in which they were placed by the treaties already mentioned.

The islands of St. Pierre and Miquelon, very small and barren spots near the south side of Newfoundland, were, by the 6th article of the treaty of Paris, ceded in full right to France; by the present articles they are to be ceded to her in the same manner.

By the treaty of Paris the French had the liberty of fishing in the gulf of St. Lawrence at the distance of three leagues from the coast of the continent and islands; this liberty is confirmed by the present articles; whether the definitive treaty shall extend this right nominally to the coast of Cape Breton and Nova Scotia, or make any regulations on that subject, I am unable to determine, thinking however that this right will be exercised by France under the 5th article of the treaty of Paris, and the 18th article of the present preliminaries.

Thus we see, that, after this very unfortunate war, we have been able to preserve these branches of our trade and marine, as far as France is concerned, nearly in the same situation in which it was placed by some of our ablest negotiators at the close of the two most glorious and successful wars in which this nation was ever engaged.

In the WEST INDIES the war in general has, on our part, been exceedingly unfortunate; with the exception of one very brilliant and conspicuous day, the memorable 12th of April 1782, every hour has almost been marked by disaster; many of our best islands have successively fallen into the hands of our enemies; of the *seven* which have been thus captured, only *one* has been retained by the French, and that perhaps among the most inconsiderable—TOBAGO, situated very far to the southward, and remote from our other Caribbée islands, as yet much unsettled



settled and uncultivated, seems but a slight recompence for such islands as GRENADA and the GRENADINES, SAINT VINCENT, DOMINICA, SAINT CHRISTOPHER'S, NEVIS, and MONTSERRAT. The island of GRENADA in the scale of commerce and national importance, outweighs many TOBAGO's; that able and excellent writer, the late Dr. Campbell, in his Political Survey of Great Britain, gives the highest degree of praise to its climate, its soil, and its productions; he mentions its freedom from the blast, its security from hurricanes, its abundance of rivers and springs; the plenty of ground provisions, vegetables of all kinds, rich fruits, animals, river and sea fish. As to its productions that enter into commerce, he says, that it is generally allowed, that whatever they are, Sugar, Cocoa, Coffee, Cotton, or Tobacco, for all in their turn have been raised there, they are the very best in their respective kinds; he mentions, that it hath been further asserted,  
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by very good authority, that the true cinnamon and nutmeg trees have been found in the forests, probably a future subject of most profitable commerce.

The ports of Grenada are many and excellent, particularly those of Calivenie, and the harbour of Fort Royal or the old Port, which are safe and deep, and sufficiently capacious to receive in each of them a large fleet of ships of the line.

The celebrated and philosophic Abbé Raynal speaks of this island in terms of the warmest approbation; he calls it the second of the British West India islands; second only to Jamaica; a few years since, while in our possession, its exports amounted to more than six hundred thousand pounds sterling.

After the late most glorious war, when we were in possession of Martinico, Guadaloupe, and a cluster of other conquered

quered islands, when our fleets enabled us to monopolize the sugar and rum trades, and when we were enabled to dictate the terms of peace, our prudent negociators thought it impolitic to irritate to madness a prostrate enemy, and unjust to the commercial world to grasp at a monopoly, which must have excited against us all the nations of the earth; the conquered islands were therefore restored; the neutral islands were divided; we were contented to enjoy the GRENADÉS, ST. VINCENT, DOMINICA, and TOBAGO, all that time of very little value: in the present moment, in the day of our mourning and adversity, the spirit and ability of our negociators have procured for us, together with the restitution of all our original islands, that of all those formerly neutral islands, except Tobago; not as before, in their weak and imperfect state, but fully productive, peopled, and wealthy; every moment growing into strength; long past the

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feebleness of infancy, and ripening into manhood.

Need I mention particularly the importance of SAINT VINCENT; its happy situation and great extent, the variety and wealth of its productions, its many good bays and harbours, particularly that of KINGSTON, where the largest ships may ride safely and commodiously? Nor is it more necessary to detail the infinite advantages of DOMINICA, placed by nature, as it were, for our benefit between Martinico and Guadaloupe, the future rival of both, and a prodigious support to the western commerce of this country.

Our old, original islands, which are all restored to us, are too well known to require any observations on their great and rising importance.

By the treaty of Paris, SAINT LUCIA was confirmed to the French; its harbour



bour alone renders it valuable; the soil is ungrateful; the air pestilential; many of our valuable officers, seamen, and soldiers, have perished there since our late acquisition of this fatal island; small, very small remains of those regiments are now to be seen, who garrisoned Morne Fortuné and the other forts when the gallant BARRINGTON so successfully repulsed the fleet of d'Estaign.—Those few gallant men can attest the truth of what I now write on this subject.

France has always thought the possession of ST. LUCIA highly necessary to the commercial security of Martinico, and, influenced by this idea, insisted on the exclusive dominion of it even after her various defeats in the former war; she obtained what she then demanded, and is it possible to suppose that, in her present hour of prosperity, any dexterity of our ministers could induce her to relinquish so favourite an object?

The harbours of Barbadoes, St. Vincent, and Grenada, lying to windward of the old French islands, will always sufficiently enable us to annoy them in time of war; in the season of peace the possession of St. Lucia, that grave of Europeans, may be truly reckoned a misfortune; the power which is to be loaded with that incumbrance pays very dearly for the possible advantages she may derive from it in the period of war; the first hour of hostility must expose its feeble and feverish garrison to the successful *coup de main* of an enterprising enemy.

Thus far it must appear that the *West India* part of this treaty, and one of the most important, is not only prudent but honourable; not such as may be supposed to darken the fullen brow of defeat, but such as may well adorn the forehead of victory.

IN AFRICA we have had eternal contentions with France, founded on a mistaken policy in both nations; commerce is usually ill supported by monopoly, but in that country monopoly is also impracticable; true policy points out the necessity of ascertaining the territorial rights of both nations, and leaving enough to each to answer every purpose of fair and just convenience; thus a generous emulation is the parent of wealth, and industry alone produces commercial superiority. By the present treaty SENEGAL and some small forts, which had belonged to France before the war of 1756, are ceded to that power, and SENEGAMBIA and SAINT JAMES'S FORT, the most capital settlements in Africa, are confirmed to Britain; GOREE, which had originally belonged to France, and was restored to her by the treaty of Paris, is again restored by the present preliminary articles; all the remaining parts of Africa, with the immense trade of Guinea, Congou, Angola, &c,

&c. are left in their former situation: thus Britain is still left in possession of that great superiority in the African trade which she has so long enjoyed; by which many of her first ports have been sustained, and by which LIVERPOOL particularly, from a meagre and inconsiderable borough, has become a place of infinite industry, wealth, and population.

IN the EAST INDIES the King of Great Britain restores the French settlements which he had taken on the coasts of Bengal and Orixá, also Pondicherry and Karical on the coast of Coromandel, with certain small districts contiguous, parts of the dependencies which originally belonged to these settlements while in the possession of France; and also Mahé and their commercial establishment at Surat on the Malabar Coast, with such liberty of trade in that country as they formerly possessed.

Let



Let those who consider the situation of the few French settlements in Bengal and Orixá, surrounded by many and much more powerful British establishments; who know that CHANDERNAGORE, their principal place in BENGAL, is on the river Hugly, commanded by the maritime force of our East India Company, and very near our strong and powerful fort of CALCUTTA, which lies between it and the Sea; let those who are informed that CHANDERNAGORE and the other French establishments in Bengal and Orixá are totally open and unfortified, and must remain so by the 11th article of the treaty of Paris, confirmed by the 18th article of the present preliminaries, and who see that by the present treaty France obtains “*liberty to surround Chandernagore with a ditch for draining the waters;*” let those who are instructed that Bengal and the other three provinces near the Ganges are absolutely subject to our East India Company, whose power there is irresistible;

feasible; let all such determine, whether the trade of France in that country is not in a most precarious state, and entirely dependent on the will and interest of Britain.

There exists not a Seapoy in the East India Company's service, who is unacquainted with the depopulated state of the districts of Pondicherry and Karical on the coasts of Coromandel; of the insufficiency of their roads and harbours, of their total want of military defence, and the impossibility of restoring their fortifications without the most ruinous expence; and of the little consequence of *Mahé* and the French comptoir of Surat on the Malabar side; even such a Seapoy must see, that the French nation, under the name of restitution in the East Indies, has been restored only to the struggles of enterprizing poverty, and the unsuccessful efforts of their national activity.

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The want of a solid and connected government in India, the want of a regular fund and territorial revenue, the want of good harbours either on the coast of Coromandel or Malabar, the necessity of retreating to the distant isles of France or Bourbon on the slightest naval disaster, in short, a thousand wants and a thousand necessities oppress the commerce and power of France in the Eastern world, so as to prevent its ever becoming, by itself, in any degree dangerous to those of Britain.

By the 16th Article of these preliminaries, the Indian Allies of France, and among them Hyder Ally, must be entirely detached from her interest; the skill of the Company's servants will easily compleat that disunion which has thus been created by the ability of our negotiators.

Little more remains to render the British power in India at all times formidable and secure; a safe and capacious port, fit to receive heavy ships of war; easily defensible; situated conveniently for every kind of oriental commerce, and protected from those fatal Monsoons which have so often destroyed our best equipped trading vessels, and rendered all our naval operations dangerous and uncertain; that alone is wanting, and that may possibly be procured by the negotiation now depending with Holland; the uncontrouled and full dominion of Trincomalé would effectually place the power of Britain in India far above the reach of her most jealous and formidable enemies.

The articles in former treaties which relate to Dunkirk contributed to hurt the pride of France, without doing any essential service to the interests of Britain; In a few weeks after the commencement  
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of hostilities against France, the port of Dunkirk was sufficiently repaired to receive and fit out vessels of force, and even frigates; it can never be rendered capable of receiving ships of the line, and can therefore never become more than a nest for privateers and light vessels, to which use it may always be converted in defiance of our strongest opposition; the minister easily saw that it was right to concede what could not be with-holden, and that this was not the season to assume the tone of useless insult. Those articles are therefore wisely abrogated and suppressed by the present preliminaries.

The subsequent articles with France relate to prisoners, prizes, the epocha's to take place as to restitution and surrender in different parts of the world, and other circumstances of course and in the ordinary style of negociation.—I shall only observe, that by the 18th Article, pro-

perly managed, some advantages in trade may be obtained, and that by the 19th, Hudson's Bay, Bencoolen, and other places taken from us, not particularly specified, must be restored.

Thus have I gone through the several articles with FRANCE, in which I have found little on which the trumpet of faction can sound even an imaginary triumph; the great demagogue himself, who has arrogantly assumed the most sacred of all titles, THE MAN OF THE PEOPLE, will attempt in vain to depreciate this part of the treaty, though his strongest efforts will probably be directed against it; he will roll his brazen thunder for some time longer, 'till even the meanest of his friends shall detect the imposture, and the offended PEOPLE, the real political Jupiter, shall hurl the rhetorical Salmoncus into the abyss of infamy.

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The Articles with SPAIN are few, and may easily be discussed.

The only alledged utility of MINORCA is grounded on the supposition of it's affording protection to our trade in the Mediterranean, and enabling our fleets to annoy our enemies in that sea.—I shall now endeavour to enquire into the truth of this position.

Our Mediterranean trade, in time of peace, extends to Spain, France, Italy, Greece, and the Levant; in time of war with the house of Bourbon, the two former kingdoms are necessarily cut off from our trade—in time of peace, our trade in that sea stands in no need of protection; even the Barbary states are our allies, and we alone, of all the nations in Europe, whiten that sea with our sails in perfect security; I have known British consuls in the Mediterranean make a scandalous and injurious traffic of this privilege, and  
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sell the benefit of the English flag to the ships of rival nations.—In time of war our trade is confined to the coasts of Italy, Greece, and the Levant, from all which countries Minorca is far distant, and out of the sailing course, particularly that of Greece and the Levant; all the ports of Italy, Villa-franca, and Nice, where we ship silk, wine, fruit, and oil; Genoa and its whole Riviera, Leghorn, and Naples (to all which we resort for similar commodities, and to all which, in our act ships, we export our native productions and manufactures to a great amount) afford ample protection to our ships of war and privateers, and gladly receive our vessels employed in that trade; Leghorn, as a station for cruizers, has ever been more useful to us than Mahon, and in the war of 1741, Villa-franca received our most numerous fleets, and from the situation of that port, they were enabled to distress the commerce and counteract the naval operations of France much



much more effectually than could have been done from the distant harbour of Mahon.

How little the possession of Minorca can assist our trade to Sicily, to the coasts of the Adriatic, to the Greek islands, to Alexandria, or to the other ports of the Levant, the slightest acquaintance with commerce and geography will easily enable us to determine.

In the present and last wars Minorca soon fell a prey to the invader; lying at the doors of France and Spain, and at a great distance from ours, the attack is quick, cheap, and effectual; the relief is slow, expensive, and usually impracticable; a numerous garrison has been long supported there at an exorbitant expence, and the place was always wrested from us at the beginning of a war, when only, if at any time, it could by any possibility prove advantageous.—I arraign not the  
defenders

defenders of this post, neither the memory of the veteran BLAKENEY, nor the valour of its late gallant commander; the public voice has acquitted them from censure, and the strictest examination has proved that Fort Saint Philip was defended to the utmost, and, by such defence, found to be far from impregnable.

But, what MINORCA cannot at this time, and never could supply, GIBRALTAR has at all times, while in our possession, most effectually afforded; the former, on the fullest trial, is ceded for its insufficiency; the latter, at all hazards, even at the risque of the continuance of war, retained in our possession: GIBRALTAR, severing the ocean from the Mediterranean, and protecting our trade in both; dividing Toulon from Brest and Rochfort, and Carthagenia from Cadiz and Ferrol; separating the maritime forces of France and Spain, and materially weakening them by such separation; GIBRALTAR, in short,

short, of infinite importance to Britain, and still rendered more dear to us by its late glorious defence, should never be ceded but with the last ship of Britain; the cession of Minorca, like the amputation of a decaying limb, must add vigour to Gibraltar, to which, as of absolute necessity to our naval independence, every attention should be paid to the remotest period.

WEST FLORIDA is retained by Spain, and EAST FLORIDA ceded to her by these preliminaries; we have tried West Florida since our possession of it by the last peace, and found it of very little importance in any line of national consideration; possessed of no good harbours, unhealthy in its climate, and limited in its extent to the Northward, it has hung as a millstone round the neck of Britain; in the view of sound policy it may be reckoned prudent to place Spain as the near neighbour of the American states;

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contention must necessarily arise where interests are really opposite, and from such contentions our late fellow citizens will soon be taught to perceive the necessity of changing their present line of policy, and of establishing a political and commercial alliance with this country, by whose mistaken selfishness they were urged to an immature and precipitate separation.

EAST FLORIDA, barren, sandy, unhealthy, and unsheltered, lies nearly in the same predicament; no real strength is, by the cession of this province, added to Spain; nor will its boasted culture of the vine, nor its Greek colony, nor its other Utopian projects, ever prove in any degree substantially advantageous: when, by the peace of Paris, it was yielded to Britain, and its various microscopic benefits holden up and magnified to the public eye by the ministerial KATTERFELTOS of that day, one of them, and not the least



least honest, and usually not the worst informed, could find nothing so useful in its supposed numerous products as the abundance of peat, which he alledged might most profitably be exported to Jamaica, and the other West India islands—Whether as *Auditor*, or in any other capacity, I believe that very respectable gentleman has not since been enabled to discover, in the bosom of his favourite Florida, any thing more materially beneficial than that species of fuel, with which he intended to have warmed his *shivering* countrymen *between the Tropics*.

If the possession of East Florida could ever have been supposed useful to Britain, its supposed utility must have been founded on the idea that the possessor of that province commands the navigation of the Gulph of Florida, and thus controuls the Flota's of Spain in their return from the Gulph of Mexico to Europe—to support this position, it should

be granted, that East Florida is possessed of harbours or good roads fit for vessels of force, where they may wait the approach of their expected prey; the contrary of this position is the known and direct truth; the only neighbouring possessions which, in any degree, command the passage of Florida are the Bahama islands, which are now restored to us, and which have, at all times of a war with Spain, most materially injured her commerce and power in that part of the world.

A prudent and attentive minister will build on the 4th Article of the preliminaries with Spain, a solid commercial establishment for his country on the continent of South America, productive of many national benefits, as well from the cutting logwood as from a beneficial connection with the Creole Spaniards, and other natives of the Bays of Honduras, and Campeachy and the Peninsula of Yucatan.

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No man of political sagacity can be found at this day, who will coolly and impartially deny the necessity of our acknowledgment of the Independence of the United States of America. — If peace with them be the object of our warmest desire; if a return of their friendship be a circumstance devoutly to be wished for, and ardently to be pursued; if by a commercial alliance with them the drooping commerce of this country may be restored to its primitive vigour; if national harmony and unanimity be desirable in the present state of these distracted kingdoms; if it be the just policy of this country to prevent the overspreading growth of the House of Bourbon, from whose branches drops of a poisonous nature must always fall on its inferior neighbours; if these, or a thousand concurrent reasons can sanctify this measure, it stands fully justified in the present situation of things, as a plan of wisdom and good policy, founded on the immutable laws  
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of nature, and the eternal principles of equity.—It seems absurd to make any observations on this part of the treaty with America, as all men are now cured of that national frenzy which lately inflamed the natives of Britain in pursuit of that hideous phantom *unconditional submission*.

The experiment of subduing America has been tried, but tried in vain; but, in all projects, though the point originally sought may be found inattainable, many discoveries are made of the highest importance and utility; we may now learn from our dearly purchased experience, that a very great extent of remote territory is seldom desirable; that as colonies on a widely-extended continent enlarge and become populous, they will, and they necessarily must, gradually recede from the controul of the original state;—the natural world gives the example; the swarm, once separated from the hive, feels and asserts its independence; the eaglet,  
who



who for the first time tries the power of his wings, rejoices in the success of the trial, and builds his own æry beyond the controul of his parent; even man, individual man, when adult, is attached to those from whom he has received his being, more by the ties of reason and gratitude, than by any bond of physical instinct, or any obligation of positive duty; nor is the son bound by any law human or divine to sacrifice his own immediate interests or the prospects of his posterity to the caprice or injustice of an unnatural father.

But this is not now a point worthy of ethical discussion—whether this be a revolution founded on nature or equity or not, it is evidently built on the broad base of sound policy, and indeed of absolute necessity,

Some ill consequences are apprehended as likely to arise from this creation of a  
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new power beyond the Atlantic ; a power which some see, by anticipation, already annihilating our navy, and destroying our commerce ; it may be necessary to advert to this subject.

Many years, nay generations, must pass before America can become a populous, and, consequently, a manufacturing country ; in an extended country, agriculture precedes manufactures ; her aspiring and impatient settlers will penetrate the recesses of the country, and long wander before they can fix in establishments able to cope with those of Great Britain in many branches of useful manufacture ; in the woollen trade particularly, from the dearness of labour and the absolute want of the *primum*, she must ever be deficient, and be principally supplied from these kingdoms.

A navy is the slow growth of time, and ages will elapse before that of America can

can singly cope with that of Britain ; the the American oak decays speedily, which must cause the necessity of eternal renewal and reparation ; the expences of a great navy are enormous and perpetual—A regular and extensive trade ; an ample national revenue ; a settled plan of systematic finance ; a single, concentered, executive power ; an united, active, and intelligent legislature ; these and many other points not yet attainable, must precede the great naval power of America.

America cannot very long remain a single power :—composed of various and discordant governments ; of provinces spread thro' half the hemisphere, different in climates and soils, jarring in habits and interests, opposite in principles and religion, separated by local prejudices and narrow jealousies, and ready to draw the sword of civil war when the COMMON CAUSE, which now unites them, shall cease to have an object ; America, thus

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circumstanced, can never, for any length of time, continue to act as *one entire and formidable whole*, or become dangerous to the liberties and independence of this country.

America will turn her arms against herself, long before she can become effectually dreadful to her neighbours; that convulsion which, in some future period, may render her government despotic at home, may contribute to render her formidable to foreign nations,

In the mean time the industry and activity of our merchants and manufacturers may be well exerted in retracing the old, and opening new channels of commerce with that great continent, and I believe, at the moment in which I write, this city has received orders to an incredible amount to supply the commercial wants of America.—May this beginning be prosperous! may it be the harbinger  
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of social connection and useful alliance between the two nations, to subsist to the remotest posterity !

The limits are settled by this treaty with the utmost precision, and, by that circumstance, the usual cause of dispute between contiguous nations is removed ; the navigation of the rivers and lakes, through which the boundary line is supposed to pass, is common to both nations as far within land as the hardiest trader has yet ventured to penetrate ; space is not wanting to either country ; what remains to us, nearly the ancient Canada, is so extensive as to render a famous calculation probable, that the accession of one hundred millions of inhabitants spread over that colony would not render it as populous as the island of Great Britain : the exclusive possession of Hudson's Bay, joined to the navigation of the lakes, of the Mississippi, and the Saint Lawrence, must give us superior advantages in the

fur trade; Montreal and Trois Rivières have long been the great Indian marts for every species of peltry; the transportation of them to Quebec, and thence to England, is speedy, easy, and not expensive; no long land-carriage; no Apalachian mountains to cross; no remoteness from the habitations of the persons employed in the trade; in short, none of the many difficulties lie in our way with which the Americans must long struggle, and under which that branch of our commerce declined daily until we became masters of Canada.

The fisheries of Newfoundland were for a considerable time the only nurseries of our seamen, while our domestic fisheries were most scandalously neglected; we knew not the wealth which the author of nature had most liberally spread all around our coasts, and of which we were the undoubted proprietors; true policy would have induced us to pursue the

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one source of wealth without neglecting the other ; in our present situation, were we disposed to attempt the monopoly of this fishery, we must fail in the attempt ; France already shares it with us under the faith of ancient treaties, of which her present importance enables her to demand the confirmation ; America claims it by long and established prescription, as a part of those rights appendant to her several governments, and naturally annexed to the proximity of her situation.—Can we seek for an alliance with America, demand an oblivion of mutual injuries, and solicit a commercial and useful intercourse, and, at the same instant refuse to our newly-reconciled dearest connection what we have granted to our ancient and dangerous competitor ? Such a proceeding would little promote the conciliation so much desired, nor could we, without a perpetual hostility with America, prevent her participation of the fishery of Newfoundland.

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The ocean still spreads an ample space for our activity and industry; the Banks of Newfoundland, the fisheries of the Gulf of Saint Lawrence, of the Labrador, of Cape Breton, and of Nova Scotia still remain unexhausted; the fisheries of the North of Scotland are most abundant, and entirely ours by every right of propriety, yet we have long shared them with our neighbours of Holland; the fisheries of the north-west coast of Ireland, both of herrings and white-fish, are sufficient to enable us to man our navy, and replenish our treasury, if we do not continue to neglect them; the Nymph Bank between England and Ireland, and another great bank, as yet little known, to the westward of fifty-two degrees latitude, and about twenty leagues from Ireland, will yet become of infinite importance when a wise and attentive administration shall turn its eyes to those great foundations of natural prosperity.

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I have heard, since the publication of the provisional treaty, that 'discontents are artfully fomented among the American Loyalists, and that they are taught to believe they have been intentionally sacrificed by administration to views of sordid and ungrateful policy ; to examine the nature of this charge we must recur to the constitution of the American government to decide, whether the Commissioners appointed by Congress, or Congress itself, can, on such an occasion, do more than recommend the restitution of confiscated estates to the humanity, policy, and justice of the federal legislatures.

My subject, widening to my view as I advance, has led me unwarily to a greater length than I had at first foreseen, I shall therefore be as brief as possible on this point, and what may follow.

By the celebrated articles of confederation of the Thirteen American States,  
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executed at Philadelphia on the 9th of July 1778, the several legislatures of those states delegated particular powers to Congress for special purposes, among others those of peace and war, the general controul of expenditure for the common interest, the decision of all disputes of boundaries and jurisdictions among the several states, and many others of a similar public and general nature.— By the second article of this confederation, “ *each state retains its sovereignty, freedom, and independence; and every power, jurisdiction, and right, which is not by this confederation expressly delegated in the United States in Congress assembled;*” among other rights not delegated to Congress, and consequently reserved, is that of each state to punish its own subjects for treason and other crimes by death, confiscation of property, or in any other manner prescribed by its own municipal laws.

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This right each state has frequently exercised with the utmost severity, and many of those unhappy men, called Loyalists, have been the victims.—Congress, the great assembly of the United States, like the council of Amphycions of ancient Greece, cannot mould or regulate the internal policy of each state, nor enter into any stipulations with foreign powers for that purpose; what the commissioners of congress can do, has been done; they have agreed that congress shall *earnestly recommend* the interests of the several classes of loyalists to the different states, and *a re-consideration and revision of all acts and laws regarding the premises, so as to render the said laws or acts perfectly consistent not only with justice and equity, but with that spirit of conciliation, which, on the return of the blessings of peace, should universally prevail.*

Who can doubt that this recommendation will be complied with, and that the

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several states of America will see the good policy of proclaiming a general amnesty, of repealing all laws of attainder and confiscation, and of thereby retaining within the bosom of their country thousands of industrious and active citizens, who must otherwise emigrate to the provinces of Canada or Nova Scotia, or into our West India islands, and thus contribute additional force and population to those countries dependent on the mother country.

I hold it clear that administration will not relax in its endeavours to obtain, for such of those unhappy men as may continue to desire it, a re-establishment in their native country; the governing powers of Great Britain are bound by every tie of conscience and gratitude to those persons, who from an excess of ill managed loyalty, or rather devotion, sacrificed every thing to the support of their  
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beloved idol, THE OMNIPOTENCE OF  
THE BRITISH PARLIAMENT.

But, if America shall add impolicy to severity, and shall permit party spirit or private interests to oppose the restitution of these men to the rights of her citizens, it suits the dignity and honour of this great state to make them some compensation, either by grants in the provinces I already mentioned, or by settling them on the waste and forest lands of this country, or in some other manner which may be adopted on mature deliberation.

Thus I have gone through all the material parts of the preliminary Articles and provisional Treaty, which have certainly confirmed a great and unprecedented revolution, and must form a most distinguished æra in the annals of mankind. Great Britain has lost considerably on the whole, but her losses are unavoidable,

and a prudent administration and wise legislature may in one point imitate the Almighty, and deduce *Good* from *Evil*— By concentrating the remaining forces of the British empire; by cultivating a liberal and amicable intercourse with Ireland; by the practice of public œconomy, and the fair encouragement of every species of national industry; by avoiding, as much as honour and sound policy will permit, all ruinous wars and burthensome foreign connections; by a systematic reduction of the national debt; by a less oppressive and expensive mode of collecting the revenue; by a liberal and equal plan of taxation; by a complete and regular support of a powerful navy; and by the adoption of some other great *political desiderata*, much may be done to preserve this a most powerful and illustrious nation, the great directress of commerce, the enlightened school of arts, and the powerful arbitress of nations.

Is there a minister endued with ability and integrity sufficient for this arduous undertaking? Are there senators upright, intelligent, and active enough to co-operate in the glorious project? Let such enter on the honourable task, convinced that the wise and virtuous of the present age will support them, and that our latest posterity will hail their names with gratitude and veneration.

T H E E N D.

*APB Sept 15 1879 + AS*

Is there a minister endowed with ability and integrity sufficient for this arduous undertaking? Are there senators upright, intelligent, and active enough to co-operate in the glorious project? Let them enter on the honorable task, convinced that the wise and virtuous of the present age will support them, and that our latest posterity will find their merits with gratitude and veneration.

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